Corporations are born to make money. Although the corporate purpose is still a highly debated topic, shareholder value maximization is a dominant theory in modern corporate law. Managers – the agents – must steer the corporation to maximize shareholder value in the best interest of the principals – those whose money is at stake.

However, the relentless pursuit of profits can push agents to misbehave. Thrilled by juicy stock options, pressured by short-termism, and threatened by the risk of failure, some officials can reach the point where delinquency becomes a justified means for corporate success.

Yet, the relationship between the profit motive and misbehavior lacks a solid theoretical framework to make sense of their causal connection and provide actionable policy proposals. Corporate purpose is primarily examined in the context of corporate governance, whereas white-collar criminology is often less concerned with the technicalities of profit maximization in modern firms.

A timely analysis, this paper aims at filling a gap in the literature by offering a systematic approach to the complicated relationship between shareholder value maximization and misbehavior, offering incentive-based and cooperation-based countermeasures and proposals to minimize criminogenic risks in value maximizing companies.