A Justified Defiance Towards Sovereign Wealth Funds?: A Tentative Defense Manual for the Wary Host State
Vol. 16
July 2016
Page
As Sovereign Wealth Funds increasingly partake in the global flows of capital, recipient countries grow wary of their dual natures as both financial investors and sovereigns’ arms. This paper aims to provide a systematic answer as to the nature of the available legal tools that a recipient country could use to protect itself from potential negative externalities stemming from SWF investments. With respect to pre‑entry barriers, we reach the conclusion that, except for explicit treaty provisions in this respect, SWF market access authorization remains broadly within the sole discretion of the home state. Once SWF investments have been allowed by the host state, its liberty to regulate such investments remains large, but is nonetheless constrained by expropriation rules and possible FET clauses.
As Sovereign Wealth Funds increasingly partake in the global flows of capital, recipient countries grow wary of their dual natures as both financial investors and sovereigns’ arms. This paper aims to provide a systematic answer as to the nature of the available legal tools that a recipient country could use to protect itself from potential negative externalities stemming from SWF investments. With respect to pre‑entry barriers, we reach the conclusion that, except for explicit treaty provisions in this respect, SWF market access authorization remains broadly within the sole discretion of the home state. Once SWF investments have been allowed by the host state, its liberty to regulate such investments remains large, but is nonetheless constrained by expropriation rules and possible FET clauses.