The existing literature on the corporate governance of Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies (SCLCs) focuses on agency costs. Scholars pay little attention to the SCLCs‟ adaptive efficiency through the lens of Venture Capital (VC). This article attempts to fill this gap on the basis of the evidence from the fundraising of Chinese domestic VC, as compared to the American VC experience. The American VC experience presents two valuable lessons for China: the great contribution of pension funds and the independent status of venture capitalists (VCs). Unfortunately, with both the “preemption effect” and state-entrepreneurism resulting from the control-based model of the SCLCs, and without alternative mechanisms, the above two benefits are still absent from Chinese domestic VCs. This study shows that adaptive efficiency and agency costs are equally important factors, which ought to be considered when proposing reforms of the corporate governance of the SCLCs. Neglecting either of them would jeopardize the overall efficiency of the economy.